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REMOVAL WITHOUT APPROVAL? CORPORATE 
LITIGATIVE AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO 
FEDERAL REMOVAL WHERE ADVERSE PARTIES 
ARE CO-EQUAL SHAREHOLDER CO-DIRECTORS 
JAMES M. MCCLURE? 
ABSTRACT 
The Case of Swart v. Pawar involved a novel question of law: 
can a president of a corporation claim authority on behalf of that 
corporation to consent to federal removal in a suit against a co-equal 
shareholder co-director even though that president lacks board ap-
proval or explicit authority from the business’s bylaws or charter? 
To address this question, the parties in Swart analogized removal 
to suit initiation and defense. Since the federal courts hearing the 
case did not assess the validity of these analogical arguments or 
a president’s removal authority generally, this Note evaluates the 
analogies as well as several solutions to the underlying question. 
The analogy of suit initiation and defense to removal proves to be 
somewhat useful given the actions’ relatively close relationship in 
the diversity context as well as the fact that courts have not distin-
guished between corporate presidential authorities to bring and 
defend suit. However, there are considerable differences between suit 
initiation, defense, and removal. An initiation-defense-removal anal-
ogy accordingly fails to fit perfectly with potential solutions aris-
ing from relevant case law. Ultimately, this Note suggests that 
courts could consider a different approach to addressing removal 
authority: discard the analogy and permit presidents to defend suit 
in a corporate emergency without recognizing an expansive presi-
dential authority to remove to federal court without board consent. 
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INTRODUCTION: A NASTY BUSINESS 
Reflecting on the tendencies of judges, Judge Richard A. 
Posner remarked: “Because Americans admire pragmatism, and 
because district judges can do a lot with their discretionary powers, 
they may come to feel—in most circumstances, I believe, uncon-
sciously—that their job is to ‘get things done ....’”1 A recent case out 
of the Northern District of West Virginia, Swart v. Pawar, lends 
some credence to Judge Posner’s suspicion that “getting things 
done” can leave, or at least reflect, ambiguities in the law.2 
Swart v. Pawar stemmed from a dispute between two radiol-
ogists, Drs. Stephany Swart (Swart) and Surendra Pawar (Pawar), 
who jointly owned a corporation for their practices, Monongalia 
Radiology Associates, P.C. (MRA).3 Incorporating under Pennsylva-
nia law in 2008, Pawar and Dr. Terre Popovich began to operate 
the corporation at Monongalia General Hospital (MGH) in Mor-
gantown, West Virginia, its principal place of business.4 When 
Swart joined the group in September of the same year as a part 
owner and secretary of the board, each doctor held a thirty-three 
percent stake of MRA.5 Dr. Popovich, the board’s treasurer, quickly 
left MRA, leaving Pawar and Swart as co-equal fifty percent share-
holders and co-directors.6 After Popovich departed, Pawar retained 
his position as president of MRA while Swart kept her secretary 
position and assumed the vacated position of treasurer.7 
                                                                                                                        
1 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 340 
(1996). 
2 Swart v. Pawar, No. 1:14-CV-10, 2015 WL 8056115, at *1 (N.D.W.V. Dec. 4, 
2015), aff’d per curiam, 684 F. App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-167, 
2017 WL 3324960 (2017); see POSNER, supra note 1, at 340. 
3 Swart v. Pawar, No. 17-167, 2015 WL 7430795, at *1 (N.D.W.V. Nov. 19, 
2015). It should be noted that the District Court of the Northern District of West 
Virginia held two separate hearings on portions of cross-motions for summary 
judgment: Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *1 and Swart, 2015 WL 8056115, at *1. 
This Note will primarily focus on the former, as the latter does not address the 
procedural matters of interest. 
4 Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *1–2. 
5 Id. at *2. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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For the following three years, MRA’s two owners enjoyed 
a turbulent coexistence.8 One problem arose over MRA’s finances.9 
The corporation contracted with an accounting firm to manage its 
accounting affairs, including pay disbursements, expense reim-
bursements, and tax filings.10 MRA’s bylaws stated that the treas-
urer of the corporation “shall ‘have custody’ of the company’s funds, 
keep accurate accounts, deposit all corporate monies, and disburse 
funds as ordered by the Board” while also specifying that the board 
of directors would determine the proper methods of inspecting the 
corporate books.11 In early 2011, Swart began to request reviews 
of the corporation’s financial information, and the accounting firm, 
on the advice of its attorney, refused to provide the information 
without Pawar’s consent.12 When Swart approached Pawar, the 
president said that she could only review the information by sign-
ing a confidentiality agreement.13 Swart claimed that she never 
received this agreement and subsequently did not review the rec-
ords, later arguing that she, as treasurer, need not do so.14 
Other disagreements arose over the corporation’s contract 
with MGH.15 This contract mandated that MRA hire additional 
physicians to bolster the hospital’s radiological services.16 In 2009, 
MRA hired Dr. Eric Johnson, a radiologist whom Pawar fired in 
2011.17 Over Swart’s protests that a second candidate was unfit 
to join the corporation, Pawar unilaterally signed an employment 
contract for that physician in December 2010.18 
By the end of 2011, MGH determined that the doctors’ rela-
tionship had devolved to the point where they could no longer sat-
isfactorily operate the firm and hire additional doctors according 
                                                                                                                        
8 For an in-depth summary of the facts surrounding the breakdown of Swart 
and Pawar’s professional relationship, see id. at *3–7. This Introduction intends 
to give some context to the case’s claims and counterclaims, but the stated facts 
are not comprehensive. 
9 Id. at *5, *7. 
10 Id. at *5. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at *5. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at *2–4, *7. 
16 Id. at *3–4. 
17 Id. at *3. 
18 Id. at *4. 
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to the terms of MRA’s contract with the hospital.19 MGH termi-
nated its contract with MRA on December 31, 2011.20 
The years of intra-corporate discrepancies culminated in 
2013 when Swart filed suit in Monongalia County Circuit Court.21 
In her complaint, the radiologist asserted claims against Pawar, 
MRA, the accounting firm, an employee of the accounting firm, and 
the accounting firm’s attorney, alleging: “(1) fraud against all de-
fendants, (2) breach of fiduciary duty against all defendants, (3) 
conversion against Pawar only, (4) legal malpractice against [the 
accounting firm’s attorney] only, and (5) accounting malpractice 
against the [accounting firm] and [the employee of the accounting 
firm].”22 In their answer, Pawar and MRA pleaded and alleged 
several counterclaims against Swart.23 
However persuasive any of these claims may have been on 
the merits, the parties’ early posturing presented the case’s novel 
and largely unresolved issue at the intersection of corporate law and 
civil procedure: removal authority in a suit against a co-equal 
shareholding co-director.24 After Swart filed suit, the accounting 
firm’s attorney filed a notice of removal.25 In the notice, he in-
cluded notices of consent from all defendants.26 Swart then moved 
to remand for lack of diversity jurisdiction and lack of unanimous 
consent to federal removal, a requirement of the removal statute, 
28 United States Code Section 1446.27 The district court denied 
                                                                                                                        
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at *8. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at *8 (MRA and Pawar alleged breach of fiduciary duty; MRA alleged 
breach of contract and contractual interference; and Pawar alleged interfer-
ence with a prospective contract as well as fraud and misrepresentation.). 
24 See, e.g., id. at *8–9, *13. See generally Swart v. Pawar, 684 F. App’x 
306 (4th Cir. 2017). 
25 Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *8. 
26 Id. 
27 See Swart, 684 F. App’x at 306 (mentioning the motion to remand on the 
grounds of lack of unanimous consent); Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *8 (men-
tioning the motion to remand on the grounds of a lack of diversity). The dis-
trict and circuit court opinions differ in the reasoning for filing the motion to 
remand. The appellate court only mentions the lack of unanimous consent, 
the key issue on appeal. See Swart, 684 F. App’x at 306. The district court 
fails to mention this reason for remand at all in the November order granting 
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the motion to remand,28 and this question of removal authority 
would become the cornerstone of the case’s appeal to the Fourth 
Circuit and denied petition for a writ of certiorari from the United 
States Supreme Court.29 
This Note will address the removal question at the heart of 
this case.30 Part I will discuss the relevant district court opinions 
in Swart,31 and then use the appellate analogical arguments of 
Swart and Pawar to highlight the missing reasoning of the dis-
trict court’s rulings that the Fourth Circuit subsequently affirmed.32 
Part II will consider the case’s suit initiation-defense-removal 
analogy, concluding that it is an imperfect, yet somewhat useful, 
means of generally evaluating the authority to remove to federal 
court given the nature of diversity removal and corporate presi-
dential authority.33 Part III will use cases from varying jurisdic-
tions to present the strengths and weaknesses of analogy-driven 
resolutions to this question of removal authority,34 suggesting that 
the optimal resolution could require a departure from the analogy.35 
                                                                                                                        
summary judgment, addressing only the claim of lack of diversity jurisdiction. 
Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *8. However, Swart’s Memorandum in Support 
of the Motion to Remand asserted both a lack of diversity jurisdiction and a lack 
of unanimous consent. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand at 
1–6, Swart v. Pawar, No. 1:14-CV-10 (N.D.W.V. Feb. 14, 2014), ECF No. 13. 
28 See Summary Order Following Scheduling Conference at 2, Swart v. 
Pawar, NO. 1:14-CV-10 (N.D.W.V. Feb. 14, 2014), ECF No. 30 (“DENIED the 
motion to remand (dkt. no. 12) ...”). 
29 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Swart v. Pawar, 2017 WL 
3327809 (2017) (No. 17-167); Corrected Brief of Appellant, Swart v. Pawar, 
684 F. App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2519). 
30 See, e.g., Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 1 (naming this 
matter as the first issue in the “Statement of the Issues” on appeal). 
31 See infra Section I.A. 
32 See infra Section I.B. 
33 See infra Part II. 
34 The District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia applied 
Pennsylvania law. See Swart v. Pawar, No. 17-167, 2015 WL 7430795, at *11 
(N.D.W.V. Nov. 19, 2015). The application of Pennsylvania law, rather than 
West Virginia law, was a contested issue at the district court and circuit court 
levels. See Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 1; Swart, 2015 WL 
7430795, at *10–12. However, this Note will only consider removal authority 
under Pennsylvania law when assessing the removal reasoning of the respective 
courts since the case’s choice of law dispute did not present any novel issues of 
law. See, e.g., Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *11. 
35 See infra Part III. 
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Finally, the Conclusion will reiterate these findings and arguments 
in the context of Swart.36 
I. INCONSISTENT CONCLUSIONS? AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT SWART ’S 
QUESTION OF REMOVAL IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS 
A. The District Court Holdings on the Motions for Summary 
Judgment 
On April 22, 2014, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of West Virginia denied Swart’s motion to remand 
for lack of jurisdiction and lack of unanimous consent to removal.37 
                                                                                                                        
36 See infra Conclusion. 
37 See Swart v. Pawar, 684 F. App’x 306, 307 (4th Cir. 2017); Swart, 2015 WL 
7430795, at *8. The United States Supreme Court first announced the “rule of 
unanimity” in Chi., Rock Island & P. Ry. Co. v. Martin. See Chi., Rock Island & 
P. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900) (concluding that “a removal could 
not be effected unless all the parties on the same side of the controversy united 
in the petition.”). In 2011, Congress codified the unanimous consent require-
ment in 28 United States Code Section 1446, the section regarding “Procedure 
for removal actions.” Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act 
of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332–1446 (2012)). In its present form, Section 1446 states that “[w]hen 
a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have 
been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the 
action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny 
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed ... to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action 
is pending.”). Federal circuits are divided as to whether the rule of unanimity 
allows one defendant to file timely notice of removal which asserts the consent 
of all other codefendants. Compare Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. 
Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1186–88 (8th Cir. 2015), and Mayo v. Bd. of Educ., 713 F.3d 
735, 742 (4th Cir. 2013), and Proctor v. Vishay Intertech. Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 
1225 (9th Cir. 2009), and Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 
200–02 (6th Cir. 2004), with Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 300–01 (7th Cir. 
1994), and Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.11 (5th 
Cir. 1988). See generally Adam R. Prescott, Note, On Removal Jurisdiction’s 
Unanimous Consent Requirement, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235 (2011). The 
Fourth Circuit has held that co-defendants satisfy the rule of unanimity when an 
attorney for a single defendant files timely notice of removal representing that all 
defendants consent. See Mayo, 713 F.3d at 742. The codefendants in Swart clearly 
satisfied this standard. See Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *8 (noting that the de-
fendant attorney for the accounting firm filed a notice of removal with separate 
notices of consent from all defendants attached). The case’s novel controversy, 
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By mid-August of 2015, Swart, Pawar, and MRA were the sole 
parties to the original complaint and counterclaims remaining in 
the litigation.38 On August 21, 2015, the plaintiff and defendants 
filed respective motions for summary judgment.39 
In considering the motions for summary judgment, the dis-
trict court addressed issues pertinent to the arguments on appeal 
regarding Pawar’s removal authority.40 Most significantly, the court 
considered Pawar’s authority to bring counterclaims against Swart 
on behalf of MRA.41 To do so, the court looked to several sections 
of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1988.42 In rele-
vant part, Section 1721 states that corporate powers enumerated 
in Section 1502 “shall be exercised by or under the authority of, 
and the business and affairs of every business corporation shall 
be managed under the direction of, a board of directors” unless 
otherwise provided by statute or a bylaw adopted by a corpora-
tion’s shareholders.43 Section 1721 notes that if a bylaw does alter 
this default rule, the powers involved “shall be exercised or per-
formed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be 
provided in the bylaws.”44 The enumerated powers in Section 1502 
include the authority “to sue and be sued, complain and defend 
and participate as a party or otherwise in any judicial, adminis-
trative, arbitrative or other proceeding in its corporate name.”45 
                                                                                                                        
therefore, lies not in unanimous consent amongst the codefendants but rather 
in the authority of Pawar to unilaterally grant consent on behalf of MRA without 
board approval. See, e.g., Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 14–19. 
38 Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *9. Pawar and MRA also filed a third-party 
complaint against Dr. Johnson and his wife. Id. at *8. The district court con-
sidered their claim and the Johnsons’ subsequent counterclaim in the November 
and December 2015 Memoranda on Motions for Summary Judgment, but these 
claims were immaterial to the issue of removal. See generally id. 
39 Id. at *9. 
40 See id. at 12–16; Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 14–19. 
Naturally, the district court did not directly consider the issue of consent to re-
moval at the summary judgment stage, as it had already addressed the issue 
when it denied Swart’s motion to remand. See, e.g., Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, 
at *9; Summary Order Following Scheduling Conference, supra note 28, at 2 
(“DENIED the motion to remand (dkt. no. 12)....”). 
41 See Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *13–14. 
42 Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1988, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1502, 
1721 (1988); see Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *11. 
43 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1721(a). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. § 1502(a). 
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Considering the bylaws themselves, the court accepted 
Pawar’s argument that the section concerning presidential au-
thority controlled the question of authority to bring suit.46 That 
section provided that the president of the corporation possessed 
“general and active management of the business of the corpora-
tion” and the responsibility to see that all orders and resolutions 
of the board of directors take effect.47 
However, the court did not accept Pawar’s contention that 
“general and active management” included the right to bring suit 
without board approval.48 Here, Pawar had relied on a 1978 Penn-
sylvania Court of Common Pleas case, Harcourt Wells, Inc. v. 
Cohen.49 Harcourt held that “the president of a corporation has 
presumptive authority, in the discharge of his duties, to defend 
and prosecute suits in the name of the corporation.”50 The dis-
trict court declined to follow Pawar’s Harcourt argument, relying 
instead on a more recent Pennsylvania case, McGuire Performance 
Sol., Inc. v. Massengill.51 The district court held that McGuire pre-
cluded Harcourt’s ruling that the “general and active management” 
power included a presumptive authority of corporate presidents 
to bring suit without board consent, particularly in the context of a 
lawsuit against a shareholder.52 Noting that “[e]ven if this Court 
were to accept the premise that [the bylaws] grant[] the presi-
dent the power to bring suit,” the judge determined that it was 
                                                                                                                        
46 Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *13 (rejecting Swart’s argument that a sec-
tion addressing majority voting for corporate actions necessitating a vote of the 
shareholders was the controlling section). For simplicity’s sake, this Note will 
refer to the arguments of defendant MRA solely as the arguments of Pawar, as 
he was asserting that he had presidential authority to bring suit and remove 
suit on behalf of MRA. 
47 Id. at *12. 
48 Id. at *12–13. 
49 Id. at *12; Harcourt Wells, Inc. v. Cohen, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 183 (Pa. C.P. 
Phila. Cty. 1978). 
50 Harcourt, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d, at 187–88 (citing Cicero Indus. Dev. Corp. v. 
Roberts, 312 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1970) and West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau 
Realty Corp., 160 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1959)). 
51 Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *12–13; McGuire Performance Sol., Inc. v. 
Massengill, 904 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
52 Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *12–13 (emphasizing that McGuire involved the 
power of corporate presidents to bring suits against third-party debtors rather 
than a general presumptive authority to bring suits against shareholders). 
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unlikely that the bylaws would presumptively, rather than explic-
itly, authorize Pawar to file a suit against a fifty percent co-equal 
shareholder because suits against shareholders are not “part and 
parcel of the business of the corporation.”53 Instead, the court held, 
Pawar could only seek a remedy on behalf of MRA through a 
derivative action.54 Since the doctor did not adequately plead the 
counterclaims as derivative actions, the court granted summary 
judgment for Swart on these counterclaims.55 
B. Arguments on Appeal: The Authorities to Bring Suit, Defend 
Suit, and Consent to Removal 
Since the District Court for the Northern District of West 
Virginia dismissed a number of Swart and Pawar’s other claims 
in its November 19, 2015 Order and the remainder of the parties’ 
claims and counterclaims in the December 4 Order, the parties 
appealed and cross-appealed to the Fourth Circuit.56 Both sides’ 
arguments on appeal alluded to an inconsistent reasoning between 
the district court’s ruling on the motion to remand and the mo-
tions for summary judgment.57 
                                                                                                                        
53 Id. at *13 (contrasting such suits with suits against third-party debtors, 
which a president could conceivably initiate under the “general and active man-
agement” power). 
54 Id. at *13. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, a shareholder may 
bring a derivative suit to “enforce a right that the corporation or association 
may properly assert but has failed to enforce.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a). Since 
Pawar, on behalf of MRA, did not adequately plead the counterclaim by stat-
ing with particularity an effort to demand that the board of directors file a 
counterclaim against Swart, the court concluded that his counterclaim failed 
as a derivative action under federal and Pennsylvania law. See Swart, 2015 
WL 7430795, at *13–15 (citing Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv’s., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 
96 (1991); Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 176 (3rd Cir. 2007); Warden v. 
McLelland, 288 F.3d 105, 110 (3rd Cir. 2002); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 
1042, 1049 (Pa. 1997); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1831 (3d ed. 2015)). 
55 See Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *14. 
56 See Swart v. Pawar, 684 F. App’x 306, 307 (4th Cir. 2017); Swart v. Pawar, 
No. 1:14-CV-10, 2015 WL 8056115, at *1 (N.D.W.V. Dec. 4, 2015), aff’d per 
curiam, 684 F. App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-167, 2017 WL 
3324960 (2017); Swart, 2015 WL 7430795, at *18–19. With regard to the par-
ties’ arguments on appeal, this Note will refer to Swart as the “appellant” and 
Pawar as the “appellee.” 
57 See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text. 
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Appellant Swart’s primary assignment of error directly ad-
dressed the relation between the motion to remand and the sub-
sequent summary judgment ruling.58 The doctor contended that 
the appellees had made the same arguments for Pawar’s presi-
dential authority to consent to removal as they made for his ability 
to bring suit at the summary judgment stage.59 A close examination 
of the defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion 
to Remand reveals this to be true.60 In the memorandum, the de-
fendants argued that pursuant to Section 1721(a), MRA “availed 
itself of the opportunity to confer the power to manage MRA upon 
the President,” as the bylaws gave Pawar “general and active man-
agement” of the corporation.61 Furthermore, the defendants had 
also cited Harcourt to assert that such removal authority included 
the power to “manage the defense of MRA in this litigation.”62 
Swart accordingly attacked the appellees’ arguments against 
remand by parroting the conclusions of the district court in its 
consideration of the motions for summary judgment.63 Address-
ing Pawar’s chief precedential case, the appellant noted that the 
district court wrote: “in the nearly forty years since Harcourt was 
decided, courts have been reluctant to afford corporate presidents 
broad authority to sue in the corporate name, particularly in 
instances where the suit would be against a co-equal 50% share-
holder.”64 Swart also pointed to the district court’s reliance on 
McGuire, quoting the court’s conclusion that “since 2006, it appears 
that Pennsylvania courts have rejected outright such a broad pre-
sumption of power [to bring suit against a co-equal shareholder 
under the ‘general and active management’ clause].”65 The appel-
lant similarly drew attention to another case which the district 
court cited, Amramsky v. Zmirli, because that Pennsylvania court 
                                                                                                                        
58 See Corrected Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 1. 
59 See id. at 14–19. 
60 See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 
at 4–6, Swart v. Pawar, 1:14-CV-10, 2015 WL 8056115 (N.D.W.V. Feb. 28, 
2015), ECF No. 17. 
61 Id. at 5. 
62 Id. at 5–6 (citing Harcourt Wells, Inc. v. Cohen, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 183, 
188, 190 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Cty. 1978)). 
63 See Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 17–19. 
64 Id. at 17 (quoting Swart v. Pawar, No. 17-167, 2015 WL 7430795, at *1 
(N.D.W.V. Nov. 19, 2015)). 
65 Id. 
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determined that such broad authority “does not appear to be a 
generally accepted legal principle in Pennsylvania.”66 Swart natu-
rally agreed with the district court’s rejection of the defendants’ 
argument that Pawar’s presidential authority allowed him to bring 
suit on behalf of MRA without board consent against a co-equal 
shareholder co-director.67 However, the appellant argued that if this 
was indeed the correct ruling, and the defendants applied the same 
contentions and outdated law on the issue of removal, then Pawar’s 
arguments in favor of removal must also fail because unilateral 
consent to removal of a case against a co-equal shareholder is akin 
to a president’s unilateral filing of such a claim.68 
Pawar’s removal argument on appeal necessarily addressed 
the district court’s holding that he could not bring direct suit, but 
the radiologist also sought to distinguish the ruling from the issue 
of removal.69 Pawar argued that if a prohibition on presidential 
authority to unilaterally bring suit likewise applies to the authority 
to unilaterally consent to removal as Swart suggested, the presi-
dent would not have the authority to defend the suit on behalf of 
the corporation.70 Such a conclusion, Pawar asserted, would be 
“preposterous” because the power to defend is naturally within 
the “general and active management” of a corporation, and without 
this authority, a corporation could risk default judgment when a 
co-equal shareholder sues a corporation.71 
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit provided no guidance on 
the issue of removal and its relationship to the power to bring and 
defend suit.72 After summarizing the parties’ appealed claims and 
                                                                                                                        
66 Amramsky v. Zmirli, No. 12-6382, 2013 WL 373274, at n.2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 
2013); see Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 18 (citing Swart,  
2015 WL 7430795, at *1). 
67 See Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 16–17, 19. 
68 See Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 18–19; Response 
Brief of Appellant at 3–5, Swart, 684 F. App’x at 306 (No. 15-2519) (arguing 
that such a lawsuit is an “extraordinary business affair[]” outside any presi-
dential power of “general and active management”). 
69 See Opening Response Brief of Appellees at 9–10, Swart, 684 F. App’x 
306 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2519). 
70 See id. at 9–10 (operating under the assumption that Swart would not 
consent to removal as a director). 
71 See id. 
72 See Swart, 684 F. App’x at 307 (adopting the district court’s findings 
without explanation). 
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counterclaims, the court merely wrote: “[a]fter careful consideration 
of the relevant legal authority and the parties’ extensive briefs 
and oral arguments, we can find no error in the district court’s 
lengthy, detailed, and careful opinions. Accordingly, we affirm on 
the basis of the district court’s excellent opinions.”73 Because the 
United States Supreme Court declined to grant a writ of certio-
rari, the case concluded without any judicial opinions extensively 
exploring the nature of the relationship between presidential au-
thorities to bring suit, defend suit, and remove suits against co-
equal shareholding co-directors.74 
Both Swart and Pawar presented cogent points. On its face, 
the district court’s rejection of presidential authority to bring di-
rect suit against a co-equal shareholder and co-director without 
board approval appears to contradict the order upholding removal 
because Pawar’s arguments for consent to removal and authority 
to bring suit are grounded in the same case law.75 However, more 
consistent reasoning denying presidential authority to unilaterally 
consent to removal could, as Pawar contended, lead courts to enter 
default judgments in similar suits due to a lack of presidential 
authority to defend suits against co-equal shareholders without 
board approval.76 As neither the district court nor the Fourth 
Circuit provided any thoughts on the legitimacy of these removal 
arguments or offered methods in which they could be reconciled,77 
further analysis is necessary. 
II. THE ANALOGY OF REMOVAL TO SUIT INITIATION AND DEFENSE 
Swart’s contention rested on the premise that corporate re-
moval authority is akin to the authority to initiate suit on behalf 
of a corporation with regard to “general and active management” 
                                                                                                                        
73 Id. 
74 See Swart v. Pawar, 138 S. Ct. 322 (2017) (denying petition for writ of 
certiorari). 
75 See Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 1, 14–19 (naming this 
matter as the first issue in the “Statement of the Issues” on appeal); see also supra 
notes 56–68 and accompanying text. 
76 See Opening Response Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 9–10. 
77 See Summary Order Following Scheduling Conference at 2, Swart v. 
Pawar, No. 1:14-CV-10, 2015 WL 8056115 (N.D.W.V. Apr. 22, 2014) ECF NO. 30 
(denying the motion to remand); see also supra notes 60–74 and accompany-
ing text. 
530 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:517 
powers.78 This analogy is an initially attractive method of exam-
ining the authority to remove because there is considerable case 
law on corporate presidential authority to initiate (and defend) suit 
in cases involving co-equal shareholder litigants whereas the au-
thority to consent to federal removal is a novel question of law.79 
The relationship between initiating, defending, and removing 
suit deserves scrutiny because both Swart and Pawar relied on the 
analogy when arguing consent to removal on appeal.80 Swart’s reli-
ance on this analogy was straightforward: if there is a close rela-
tionship between a president bringing and removing suit, and the 
district court correctly applied Pennsylvania law at the summary 
judgment stage, then the district court erred in allowing Pawar to 
consent to removal.81 Pawar’s counter-argument essentially raised 
two points of analogy. First, a president should have the power to 
remove, derived from a power to bring and defend suit under 
Pennsylvania law and “general and active management” author-
ity.82 Although Pawar did not explicitly regard it as a separate 
argument, he made a second, distinct claim analogizing removal 
to defense out of necessity in a corporate emergency.83 Accordingly, 
the suit initiation-defense-removal analogy must “fit” for either 
party’s argument to provide an entirely satisfactory answer to the 
question of removal authority. 
A. The Analogy in Diversity 
Because Swart concerned removal for diversity jurisdiction, 
a comparison between the powers to initiate, defend, and remove in 
diversity is a good starting point when considering the aptitude of 
the analogy.84 The general powers to defend suit and remove suit 
                                                                                                                        
78 See, e.g., Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 16–19. 
79 See generally 2A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 618.10 (Carol A. Jones, ed.) (rev. vol. 2017). 
80 See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 16–19; Opening 
Response Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 7–10. 
82 See Opening Response Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 7–10. 
83 See id. at 10 (insinuating that Swart’s argument on removal logically leads 
to the conclusion that a corporate president cannot defend suit and must passively 
allow for default judgment against his corporation). 
84 See Notice of Removal at 1, Swart v. Pawar, No. 1:14-CV-10, 2015 WL 
8056115 (N.D.W.V. Jan. 15, 2014) ECF NO. 1 (petitioning to remove “based 
upon diversity jurisdiction conferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012)”). 
2019] REMOVAL WITHOUT APPROVAL? 531 
share a tight bond, ostensibly closer than that of removing suit and 
initiating suit.85 Only a defendant may remove to federal court,86 
and a defendant has a right to remove “any” civil state court cases 
which would be subject to original jurisdiction in federal courts.87 
However, the right to initiate suit in diversity is also closely con-
nected to the rights to defend and remove.88 For one, a plaintiff 
must be able to bring suit in diversity for a defendant to defend and 
remove suit in diversity.89 The primary justification for the removal 
right in diversity—the idea that federal courts are less likely to 
be prejudiced against defendants who are not residents of the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum than local courts—also mirrors a main 
justification of original jurisdiction in diversity.90 The powers to 
bring and defend suit in diversity therefore share a relatively 
close bond with the right to remove in diversity suits.91 
However, the rights to bring and defend litigation in di-
versity are far from identical to that of removal.92 Although the 
                                                                                                                        
85 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (granting defendants, rather than plain-
tiffs, the power to remove). See generally 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2017) (explaining that jus-
tification for removal is based on policy to protect defendants from local bias). 
86 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
87 See, e.g., id.; St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 
294 (1938) (“The claim ... fixes the right of the defendant to remove, and the 
plaintiff ought not to be able to defeat that right and bring the cause back to the 
state court at his election.”) (emphasis added); Lott v. Pfizer, 492 F.3d 789, 793 
(7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he removal statute encourages litigants to make liberal use 
of federal courts, so long as the right to remove is not abused.”); In re Briscoe, 
448 F.3d 201, 215 (3d Cir. 2006) (“By statute, a defendant has the right to re-
move a civil action from state court if the case could have been brought origi-
nally in federal court.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)); Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 667 F.2d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 1982) (“28 U.S.C. § 1441 creates a broad right of 
removal which can be limited only by an act of Congress expressly prohibiting it.”). 
88 See, e.g., infra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (providing for diversity jurisdiction); § 1441(a) 
(“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action 
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants ....”). 
90 See, e.g., 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL 
§ 107.3 (3d ed. 2018); James Wm. Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity 
Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1964) (writing 
that state court prejudice, or a fear thereof, was a primary reason for original 
support for statutory diversity jurisdiction). 
91 See 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 90, § 107.04. 
92 See id. 
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power to remove in diversity is predicated on the ability of a 
plaintiff to initially bring the claim in diversity, original diversity 
jurisdiction is ultimately derived from the United States Consti-
tution.93 The right to remove is entirely statutory.94 The federal 
courts and Congress have further distinguished the right to ini-
tiate and defend in diversity from the right to remove.95 The 
United States Supreme Court held in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. 
v. Sheets that a plaintiff “defending” against counterclaims is pro-
hibited from removing the suit to federal court.96 Since Shamrock 
Oil, federal courts have tended to restrict removal to parties they 
deem to be “true defendants,” barring removal by litigants such 
as intervening plaintiffs defending against cross-claims, cross-claim 
defendants where the cross-claim alone is removable, and addi-
tional counterclaim defendants.97 Moreover, courts have the ability 
                                                                                                                        
93 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Contro-
versies ... between Citizens of Different States ....”); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (2012); 
16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 90, § 107.04. 
94 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441; 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 90, § 107.04. 
95 See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
96 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106–07 (1941) (hold-
ing that a plaintiff who selected the state court forum could not subsequently 
remove to federal court after a defendant subsequently filed a counterclaim). 
97 See, e.g., In re Crystal Power Co., 641 F.3d 78, 79 (5th Cir. 2011), withdrawn 
on other grounds, 641 F.3d 82 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The case was removed ... by an 
intervening plaintiff who became named as the defendant on several cross-
claims. Because the removal statute may only be invoked by a true defendant, 
not a cross-defendant, we ... instruct the district court to remand the case to state 
court.”) (emphasis added); Palisades Collections, LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 
333 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]dditional counter-defendants, like third-party defendants, 
are certainly not defendants against whom the original plaintiff asserts claims. 
Thus, we easily conclude that an additional counter-defendant is not a ‘defendant’ 
for purposes of § 1441(a).”); Lawyers Title Ins. v. Pioneer Nat’l Title Ins., 600 
F. Supp. 402, 404 (D.S.C. 1984) (“The court is of the opinion that removal is 
improper under § 1441(c) when the only removable claim is asserted by cross-
claimants.”). Since federal courts determine which parties are “true defendants,” 
parties who defend against certain claims and are considered defendants in state 
court may accordingly lack the ability to remove because they are not defendants 
under the federal removal statute. See, e.g., Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 579–80 (1954). For a summary of the types of cases where a 
party “defending” a claim has been denied removal and the methods federal 
courts use to determine “true defendants,” see generally 16 MOORE ET AL., supra 
note 90, § 107.41. In the context of this discussion, it is merely important to recog-
nize that a party may “defend” against certain types of claims yet lack the power 
to remove where diversity jurisdiction otherwise exists. 
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to remand for procedurally defective removal in cases where original 
diversity jurisdiction would otherwise exist.98 Legislative provi-
sions further limiting these rights include the prohibition against 
diversity removal if the defendant is a resident of the state where 
the plaintiff commenced the action and the one-year statutory time 
limit by which a defendant must remove.99  
Put simply, there are many peculiar circumstances in po-
tential diversity suits where a party can defend against a claim 
but cannot successfully remove that claim.100 These instances 
where the right to remove diverges from the right to initiate or 
defend suit do not entirely delegitimize the analogy,101 but they 
highlight the idea that the actions have a somewhat tenuous re-
lationship that may present difficulties when using the analogy 
to examine initiation-defense case law to address the issue of 
removal authority.102 
B. The Analogy in the Context of Swart’s Corporate Dispute 
With the understanding that the relationship between the 
powers to initiate, defend, and remove suits in diversity has lim-
its,103 a comparison between court treatment of the authority of 
a corporate president to initiate suit and the authority to defend 
suit is also necessary to evaluate the Swart analogies.104 Such 
                                                                                                                        
98 See 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 90, §§ 107.41, 107.151. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, federal courts differ on what defects are sufficient to remand for “defect 
in removal procedure.” See id. Lack of unanimity is generally considered a pro-
cedural defect, but it is not always fatal. See, e.g., Chambers v. HSBC Bank USA, 
N. Am., 796 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2015); Albert v. Bayerische Motorenwerke 
Aktiengesollschaft, 45 F. App’x 170, 171 (3d Cir. 2002); McMahon v. Bunn-O-
Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1998); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 
699, 703 (9th Cir. 1998). 
99 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b), 1446(c)(1) (2012); 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 
90, § 107.04. 
100 See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 85–99 and accompanying text. 
102 For a more in-depth consideration of this idea, see Part III. 
103 See supra Section II.A. 
104 See infra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. Since Section II.A dem-
onstrated that the authority to defend in diversity is predicated on a plain-
tiff’s ability to bring suit in diversity, Section II.B’s mode of analysis would be 
redundant in the diversity context. See, e.g., supra note 89. The analysis of this 
portion of Part II instead demonstrates that courts do not distinguish between the 
authority to bring suit and the authority to defend suit in the stated context. 
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analysis is critical because the cases considering presidential litiga-
tive authority typically involve presidents who initiate or defend 
suit without board approval.105 A marked distinction between the 
authority to defend and the authority to initiate suit would further 
wrinkle Part III’s evaluation of the analogy of these authorities to 
removal authority.106 
This inquiry, however, reveals that courts considering presi-
dential litigative authority do not distinguish between the authority 
to initiate and the authority to defend such suits.107 Most courts 
have simply ruled on suit initiation or defense without mentioning 
the other action or drawing a distinction between the two, an un-
derstandably narrow consideration given that a president’s au-
thority to initiate and defend litigation is not always at issue in a 
singular case.108 Others have ruled on the authority at issue—suit 
initiation or defense—but have discussed both authorities as if 
                                                                                                                        
105 Compare, e.g., Custer Channel Wing Corp. v. Frazer, 181 F. Supp. 197 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (concerning the president’s authority to initiate suit), with 
Kelly v. Citizens Fin. Co. of Lowell, 28 N.E.2d 1005 (Mass. 1940) (concerning 
the president’s authority to defend suit without board approval). 
106 See infra Part III for this evaluation. For instance, a court could con-
ceivably hold that the authority to initiate suit differs from the authority to 
defend suit in a certain context. 
107 See infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. Many of the citations 
immediately following this footnote involve presidential authority to initiate 
and defend suits against co-equal shareholders. See, e.g., 1-800 Postcards, Inc. v. 
Morel, 153 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Glisson Coker, Inc. v. Coker, 
581 S.E.2d 303, 305–06 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). The reasoning of such decisions 
relevant to Swart’s removal will be analyzed in Part III. See infra Part III. In the 
present portion of the analysis, they merely serve to show that courts do not tend 
to rule that a president may defend such suits but not initiate them, demonstrat-
ing that the corporate context itself does not delegitimize an analogy between 
the abilities to initiate suit, defend suit, and remove suit. 
108 See, e.g., Regal Cleaners & Dyers v. Merlis, 274 F. 915, 917 (2d Cir. 1921) 
(holding that a corporate president may have authority to answer a bankruptcy 
petition without board approval); 1-800 Postcards, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (finding 
that the president had implied authority to institute a lawsuit where a fifty 
percent co-equal shareholder and director engaged in tortious conduct to the 
detriment of the corporation); Glisson Coker, 581 S.E.2d at 305–06 (finding no 
authority for president to file suit against co-equal defendant shareholder with 
equal amount of control of the close corporation); Kelly, 28 N.E.2d at 1006 (hold-
ing that the president did not have authority to hire an attorney to defend 
suit); Tidy-House Paper Corp. v. Adlman, 168 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (App. Div. 1957) 
(“There can be no implied authority on the part of an officer of a corporation to 
sue one in equal control.”). 
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they are indistinguishable.109 Notably, the three main Pennsyl-
vania cases on presidential authority cited in Swart—Harcourt 
Wells, McGuire, and Amramsky—do not draw any distinction be-
tween presidential authority to bring and defend suit without 
board approval.110 
A few courts have explicitly addressed the authority of cor-
porate presidents to prosecute and defend suits without board 
approval.111 In one notable case, West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau 
Realty Corp., a New York court ruled on the ability to bring suit 
but broadly held that “the president has presumptive authority, 
in the discharge of his duties, to defend and prosecute suits in the 
name of the corporation.”112 The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
has gone so far as to state that presidential authority to defend 
suit without board approval logically leads to the conclusion that 
presidents have the authority to initiate suit as well.113 
                                                                                                                        
109 See, e.g., Ono v. Itoyama, 884 F. Supp. 892, 896–99 (D.N.J. 1995) (discuss-
ing precedent on corporate presidential authority to defend suit and ruling on 
a case concerning suit initiation); Anmaco, Inc. v. Bohlken, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 
679, 679 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993) (ruling on the authority to initiate but noting that 
“[w]e express no view on the president’s power to institute or defend litigation 
in an emergency or involving an outsider or where the bylaws may grant the 
power to do so.”); Conlee Constr. Co. v. Cay Constr. Co., 221 So. 2d 792, 795–96 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that a president had an affirmative duty to sue a 
director and co-equal shareholder but noting that there is precedent supporting 
the authority to bring suit and defend suit); Chun v. Bd. of Trs., 952 P.2d 1215, 
1228 (Haw. 1998) (ruling on an administrator’s authority to appeal but noting that 
corporate presidents have been allowed to bring and defend suit to “preserve vital 
corporate interests [where] urgent.”) (quoting Conlee, 221 So. 2d at 795–96)). 
110 See Amramsky v. Zmirli, No. 12-6382, 2013 WL 373274, at *2, n.2 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 31, 2013) (addressing the defendants’ contentions that a president has 
the authority to bring or defend suit on behalf of the corporation based on 
Harcourt’s precedent); McGuire Performance Sol., Inc. v. Massengill, 904 A.2d 
971, 976–77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (ruling on authority to institute suit and 
refraining from addressing or distinguishing the authority to defend suit); 
Harcourt Wells, Inc. v. Cohen, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 183, 187–88 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Cty. 
1978) (addressing the authority to bring suit but discussing New York cases 
addressing the authority to bring or defend suit). 
111 See infra notes 112–13. 
112 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 160 N.E.2d 622, 623 (N.Y. 1959) 
(quoting Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman, 141 N.E.2d 610, 613 (1957)). 
113 See Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 1 A.2d 204, 207 (N.J. 1938) (“If ... a 
president of a corporation may take the necessary steps in defense of litiga-
tion prosecuted against his corporation ... so, in reason and justice, he may 
employ and authorize counsel to institute necessary legal proceedings for the 
like purpose ....”). 
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But although many courts do not make such broad holdings 
on corporate presidential authority to both bring and defend suit,114 
they also do not distinguish between the authorities to initiate and 
defend when discussing different sources of litigative authority.115 
This lack of distinction is relevant to Swart’s question of removal by 
a corporate president with “general and active management” or 
“emergency” powers.116 On appeal, Swart argued that the district 
court’s holding that Pawar lacked authority to bring suit under 
“general and active management” powers and Pennsylvania law 
should extend to Pawar’s authority to consent to removal on behalf 
of MRA.117 Pawar countered, arguing that the right to defend 
incorporated the right to remove and that the right to defend is 
an essential action of business management.118 But Pawar also 
made what amounts to an “emergency” authority argument, assert-
ing that a lack of authority to defend, and thus remove, would be 
illogical because courts would enter default judgment against 
corporate defendants in cases where the board does not authorize 
defense.119 The difference between Pawar’s “emergency” and “gen-
eral and active management” arguments is palpable, yet courts 
discussing these sources of presidential litigative authority do not 
distinguish between initiation and defense.120 
Taken as a whole, this Part’s evaluations indicate that the 
initiation-defense-removal analogy is an imperfect yet potentially 
workable method of exploring a corporate president’s authority to 
remove suit to federal court.121 The rationale of removal in diversity 
mirrors that of the power to file and thus defend diversity claims,122 
                                                                                                                        
114 Contra supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
115 See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text. 
116 See, e.g., Opening Response Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 9–10. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 7–10. 
119 See id. at 10; see also infra Section III.A. 
120 Compare, e.g., Anmaco, Inc. v. Bohlken, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 
1993) (evaluating the authority to initiate suit against a co-equal shareholder 
with regard to a bylaw granting the president “general supervision, direction and 
control of the business and officers of the corporation”), with West View Hills, 
Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 160 N.E. 2d 622, 623–24 (N.Y. 1959) (holding that the 
president had authority to initiate suit without board authorization or any bylaw 
provision because it was necessary to protect the interests of the corporation). 
121 See supra Sections II.A–B. 
122 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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but there are notable exceptions to the function of original diver-
sity jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction.123 Courts also do not 
distinguish between initiation and defense in cases involving presi-
dential authority to sue and defend suit on behalf of the corpora-
tion without board consent.124 The analogy, though imperfect, could 
therefore conceivably present resolutions to Swart’s question of 
removal authority. 
III. FILLING IN THE GAPS: APPLYING ... AND RETHINKING THE 
INITIATION-DEFENSE-REMOVAL ANALOGY 
 When considering the initiation-defense-removal analogy, 
possible resolutions to the removal issue in Swart arise when 
surveying decisions concerning the litigative powers of corporate 
presidents who lack board approval to bring or defend suit.125 
Any conclusions will be limited in scope for several reasons. As 
noted, the initiation-defense-removal comparison is imperfect.126 
The law of corporations is also largely the province of the indi-
vidual states,127 and varying jurisdictions apply different corpo-
rate laws to corporate entities with articles of incorporation and 
bylaws that do not precisely mirror those of MRA.128 With these 
limitations in mind, case law on presidential litigative authority 
suggests three major outcomes for the question of removal in 
Swart: Pawar possessed emergency authority to remove to fed-
eral, Pawar lacked requisite authority to act against a co-equal 
shareholder and director, and a divergence from the initiation-
defense-removal analogy altogether in favor of a more pragmatic 
approach to the issue.129 
                                                                                                                        
123 See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 107–14 and accompanying text. 
125 See infra Sections III.A–C. 
126 See supra Section II.A. 
127 See, e.g., 2A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 79, § 2.50 (“Modern corporations 
are creatures of statute, deriving their existence and authority to act from the 
state. Today, the statutes of every state contain a corporations or general 
business act or code.”) (footnote excluded). 
128 See id. § 146 (noting that most states permit corporations to include some 
provisions for the “management of business and the regulation of affairs of ... 
corporation[s]” within their articles of incorporation); § 4166 (explaining general 
ways in which courts apply state corporate law to corporations’ bylaws, the pri-
mary documents regulating the management and internal affairs of corporations). 
129 See infra Sections III.A–C. 
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A. A Problematic Proposition: Pawar Possessed Authority to  
Remove Suit in an Emergency Situation Against Swart as 
President of MRA 
Of Pawar’s two arguments,130 courts siding with corporate 
presidents in disputes similar to that of Swart have tended to favor 
his “emergency” argument.131 Pawar’s claim that “[t]aken to its logi-
cal evolution, absent the permission and consent of Swart, Pawar as 
President would not have the authority to defend the action brought 
by Swart thus resulting in a default judgment,”132 amounts to an 
agency argument that the president possesses authority to initiate, 
defend, and remove suit to protect the corporation and its property 
during an emergency.133 
Multiple courts have recognized similar authority.134 In the 
1938 case Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held that a president could both defend and initiate suit 
on behalf of his corporation to “preserve the corporate assets” where 
his family owned half of the company’s stock and the defendant 
                                                                                                                        
130 See Opening Response Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 7–10. 
131 See, e.g., 1-800 Postcards, Inc. v. Morel, 153 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 
Conlee Constr. Co. v. Cay Constr. Co., 221 So. 2d 792, 796–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1969); Lydia E. Pinkham Med. Co. v. Gove, 9 N.E.2d 575, 579–80 (Mass. 
1937); First Cmty. St. Bank of Savannah v. Pemberton, 493 S.W.2d 692, 696 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 1 A.2d 204, 204–07 (N.J. 
1938); West View Hills v. Lizau Realty Corp., 160 N.E.2d 622, 624 (N.Y. 1959); 
Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman, 141 N.E.2d 610, 613 (N.Y. 1957); 
2A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 79, § 618.10; Roger J. Goebel, The Authority 
of the President Corporate Litigation: A Study in Inherent Authority, 37 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 29 (1962); infra Section III.B.  
132 Opening Response Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 10. 
133 See, e.g., First Cmty. St. Bank, 493 S.W.2d at 696 (concluding that the case’s 
circumstances “combined to create an emergency situation in which Hayden justi-
fiably felt that he had to take prompt action in his capacity as president with-
out any further effort to call upon the demoralized Board ....”); see also 1-800 
Postcards, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (describing emergency agency author-
ity as “implied” authority). For an analysis of why this authority is primarily 
inherent authority, see generally Goebel, supra note 131. Section III.B will address 
Pawar’s other claim of authority to remove, an argument more clearly asserting 
“implied” authority. See infra Section III.B. For the purposes of this section 
analyzing case law on initiation-defense-removal, it does not matter whether 
the emergency authority is actually “implied” or “inherent.” 
134 See generally 2A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 79, § 618.10. 
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shareholder’s family owned the other half of the shares.135 Expound-
ing on this emergency principle in 1958, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that a president must be able to institute or defend 
suit to “protect and preserve the interest of the plaintiff corpora-
tion” unless “a provision in the by-laws of action by the board of 
directors prohibit[s] the president from defending and institut-
ing suit in the name of and in behalf of the corporation.”136 A 
Florida Court has gone so far as to overrule a bylaw that would 
have otherwise blocked a president’s direct suit against a defendant 
stockholder who, along with his wife, controlled half of the board.137 
More recently, the Southern District of New York, applying New 
York law in a case involving deadlocked 50% co-equal shareholder 
directors, found that a president had implied authority to institute 
suit against his fellow co-equal shareholder for tortious conduct 
harming the corporation.138 
But while some courts have recognized this emergency au-
thority to bring and defend suit against co-equal shareholder direc-
tors without board consent,139 this potential resolution to Swart’s 
                                                                                                                        
135 See Elblum Holding Corp., 1 A.2d at 204–07; see also Lydia E. Pinkham 
Med. Co., 9 N.E.2d at 579–80 (finding a presidential “duty to act” under simi-
larly adverse co-equal familial ownership without explicitly discussing neces-
sity or emergency). 
136 West View Hills, Inc., 160 N.E.2d at 624 (applying the principle to a case 
with deadlocked co-directors who were not co-equal shareholders); see, e.g., 
Rothman & Schneider, Inc., 141 N.E.2d at 613 (“Where there has been no direct 
prohibition by the board, then, it has been held, the president has presump-
tive authority, in the discharge of his duties, to defend and prosecute suits in 
the name of the corporation.”); see also Goebel, supra note 131, at 69, 79–80, 80, 
n.180 (concluding that this emergency power in West View Hills is actually 
inherent rather than implied authority because it derives from the agency rela-
tionship rather than any factual implication by the principal corporation to 
the agent president). 
137 See Conlee Constr. Co. v. Cay Constr. Co., 221 So. 2d 792, 796–97 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1969) (emphasizing that prohibiting plaintiff president’s suit would 
amount to immunity for defendant). 
138 See 1-800 Postcards, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (determining that even where 
the litigants are co-equal shareholders, “[t]he president of a corporation faced 
with a deadlocked board has implied authority in emergency situations to take 
actions necessary to protect the corporation that otherwise would require 
board action.”). 
139 See id.; Conlee Const. Co., 221 So. 2d at 792; Lydia E. Pinkham Med. 
Co., 9 N.E.2d at 575; Elblum Holding Corp., 1 A.2d at 204; West View Hills, Inc., 
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question of removal has significant complications. First, courts 
have inconsistently applied emergency authority with regard to 
litigation in co-equal shareholder cases.140 For instance, in Ster-
ling Industries v. Ball Bearing Corporation, the New York Court 
of Appeals determined that no emergency existed where the 
plaintiff’s affidavits merely asserted that the suit was “critical and 
vital to the interests of the corporation,” and lacked any factual 
showing of an “urgency” to presently preserve the day to day busi-
ness of the corporation.141 Ten years later, in West View Hills, 
the same court created a “presumptive” presidential authority to 
initiate or defend suit on behalf of the corporation in emergency 
circumstances without any substantive factual showing.142 Courts 
have subsequently read these two cases together without hold-
ing that West View Hills supersedes Sterling Industries.143 Since 
courts have not explicitly considered the issue of emergency au-
thority for removal, it is unclear whether courts recognizing emer-
gency removal authority should endorse a broader or narrower 
application of such power.144 
Second, and more pertinently, it is possible that “emergency” 
circumstances may never justify recognition of presidential removal 
authority.145 Courts have been reluctant to say that corporate 
presidents have no authority to initiate and defend suit where 
they would otherwise be barred from obtaining a legal remedy or 
mounting any legal defense, but an emergency situation that re-
quires defense of a corporation’s assets does not clearly necessitate 
                                                                                                                        
160 N.E.2d at 622; Rothman & Schneider, Inc., 41 N.E.2d at 610; 2A FLETCHER 
ET AL., supra note 79, § 618.10; supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
140 Compare, e.g., Elblum Holding Corp., 1 A.2d at 204–07, and West View 
Hills, Inc., 160 N.E.2d at 624, with Sterling Indus. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 
84 N.E.2d 790, 794 (N.Y. 1949). 
141 See Sterling, 84 N.E.2d at 794; see also Chun v. Bd. of Trs., 952 P.2d 1215, 
1228 (Haw. 1998) (citing Sterling’s focus on evidentiary findings and urgency). 
142 See West View Hills, Inc., 160 N.E.2d at 622–24 (assuming the veracity of 
the emergent allegations outlined in the complaint). 
143 See, e.g., Ono v. Itoyama, 884 F. Supp. 892, 898 (D.N.J. 1995) (discussing 
the opinions’ rationales with regard to emergency authority under the facts of 
each case); Stone v. Frederick, 666 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295–96 (App. Div. 1997). 
144 Compare West View Hills, Inc., 160 N.E.2d at 623–24 (expounding the 
broad conception of emergency authority), with Sterling, 84 N.E.2d at 794 (dis-
cussing narrower conditions for emergency authority to initiate and defend suit). 
145 See infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
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a recognition of removal authority where remedies are available 
in state court.146 Emergency circumstances could conceivably allow 
a president to defend suit from a co-equal shareholder in state 
court without enabling removal to federal court.147 
This would not be an unreasonable conclusion for two rea-
sons. For one, the overwhelming body of state court cases on co-
equal shareholder initiation and defense indicates that a state court 
proceeding does not inherently prejudice a corporation where a 
remedy is available.148 Additionally, there are many circumstances 
where otherwise “diverse” parties’ abilities to bring and defend a 
suit diverge from the ability to successfully remove to federal 
court.149 The case law on emergency authority does not yield the 
conclusion that such power must necessarily extend to removal, 
rendering the analogy a less than satisfactory method of resolving 
the removal question in light of emergency powers arguments.150 
B. A Second Flawed Solution: Pawar Could Not Consent to  
Removal on Behalf of MRA Because He Lacked Implied  
Authority to Initiate and Defend Suit Against a 50%  
Co-equal Shareholder 
Another potential solution is a finding that Pawar lacked 
actual authority, express or implied under “general and active 
                                                                                                                        
146 See, e.g., Glisson Coker, Inc. v. Coker, 581 S.E.2d 303, 305–06 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003) (adopting the Stone rule that where a derivative suit is possible, 
“an action cannot be maintained in the name of the corporation by one stock-
holder against another with an equal interest and degree of control over the 
corporate affairs.”); Anmaco, Inc. v. Bohlken, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 679, 679 
n.2 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a derivative, rather than direct, suit is the 
proper initiative for a president of a corporation to protect the interests of the 
company against a co-equal shareholder and co-director but reserving judg-
ment on initiation and defense in emergency circumstances); West View Hills, 
Inc., 160 N.E.2d at 623 (expressing reservation that “corporate interests may 
be prejudiced if not entirely destroyed” without presumptive presidential author-
ity to bring or defend suit); Stone, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 295–96 (emphasizing that 
derivative actions are proper for suits against co-equal shareholders but not-
ing that West View Hills does not apply this rule because it did not involve co-
equal shareholder directors and it concerned an actual emergency). 
147 Cf. West View Hills, Inc., 160 N.E.2d at 623. 
148 See generally Conlee Constr. Co. v. Cay Constr. Co., 221 So.2d 792 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Anmaco, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675; Glisson, 581 S.E.2d at 303; 
Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 1 A.2d 204 (N.J. 1938); Stone, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 294. 
149 See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text. 
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management” powers, to remove suit based on the initiation-
defense-removal analogy.151 An agent, such as a president of a 
corporation, acts with actual authority when she “take[s] action 
designated or implied in the principal’s manifestations to the 
agent and acts necessary or incidental to achieving the principal’s 
objectives, as the agent reasonably understands the principal’s 
manifestations and objectives when the agent determines how to 
act.”152 Sources vary on whether emergency authority is “implied” 
authority or inherent.153 However, Swart’s argument that MRA’s 
presidential “general and active management” authority precluded 
removal, just as it precluded initiating suit against a co-equal 
director-shareholder without board approval, amounts to an ar-
gument against implied actual authority.154 Likewise, Pawar’s 
counter-argument that “[n]othing is more fundamental than a 
corporation’s right to defend itself in litigation” responded to Swart’s 
claim by insinuating that the general management powers of a 
corporation powers imply the authority to respond to suit.155 
Pawar’s argument sees little support in the case law because 
most courts have not ruled that general management impliedly 
extends to defending suit against co-equal shareholder directors 
in court.156 Some courts have found that general management of 
a corporation includes the ability to bring or defend suit on mat-
ters concerning ordinary business affairs of the corporation,157 
                                                                                                                        
151 See infra notes 152–66 and accompanying text. 
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: SCOPE OF ACTUAL AUTHORITY § 2.02 (AM. 
L. INST. 2006). 
153 See supra notes 133, 136.  
154 See Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 14–19; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 (AM L. INST. 2006). 
155 Opening Response Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 9–10 (asserting 
the distinguishable emergency claim that a defendant corporation would face 
default judgment without the power to defend and remove itself). 
156 See infra notes 157–60 and accompanying text. 
157 See, e.g., Covington Housing Dev. v. City of Covington, 381 F. Supp. 
427, 429–30 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Chun v. Bd. of Trs., 952 P.2d 1215, 1228 (Haw. 
1998); Paloma Frocks, Inc. v. Shamokin Sportswear Corp., 147 N.E.2d 779, 
781 (N.Y. 1958) (holding that a corporate president had authority to initiate arbi-
tration where the board had previously contracted to an arbitration clause and 
“half of the directors of his corporation represent the other contracting party 
on his corporation’s board and presumably would not vote in favor of bringing 
the dispute before arbitrators.”); Durfee & Canning v. Canning, 82 A.2d 615, 619 
(R.I. 1951) (determining that a president’s action against a defendant co-director 
who, with his wife, owned 50% of stock in the corporation, was entitled to bring 
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but only one notable case, Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 
has held that a “general grant of managerial power” amounts to the 
authority to bring suit against co-equal shareholder directors for 
tortious activity.158 Of course, the district court in Swart also 
agreed that Pennsylvania law did not support an implied authority 
to initiate suits unrelated to the ordinary business of the corpo-
ration in the context of bylaw “general and active management” 
powers.159 Considering the dearth of law supporting an implied 
presidential authority to initiate or defend suits pertaining to mat-
ters outside of ordinary business matters, a court applying the 
analogy could reason that such powers do not confer implied author-
ity upon a president to remove to federal court.160 
The problem with this approach lies in the rationale that 
courts use to deny authority to initiate suit.161 Many courts have 
denied broad implied or inherent authority to bring suit against 
a co-equal shareholder for actions outside the scope of ordinary 
business because corporate officers could also bring derivative 
shareholder suits.162 As a Louisiana federal court explained in 
                                                                                                                        
suit to collect debts from the defendant because the collection of debts fell within 
the ordinary business of the corporation). 
158 Lydia E. Pinkham Med. Co. v. Gove, 9 N.E.2d 573, 578 (Mass. 1937) 
(holding that defendant family members who were co-directors and collectively 
owned 50% of company stock “violated their fiduciary obligations toward the 
plaintiff, and that they have acted in excess of their authority and used their 
official positions in the corporation to the detriment of its interests from motives of 
personal advantage and in order to compel a sale of the Pinkham stock.”). 
159 See Swart v. Pawar, No. 17-167, 2015 WL 7430795, at *13–15 (N.D.W.V. 
Nov. 19, 2015) (noting that the Pennsylvania court in McGuire “recognized the 
difference between a suit against another shareholder, and the typical sort of 
suit to collect third-party debts that one might pursue in the general and active 
management of a corporation.”). 
160 See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text. 
161 See infra notes 162–66 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Innovative Therapy Prods. v. Roe, No. 98-1506, 1998 WL 405049, 
at *6 (W.D. La. July 17, 1998) (“The Court’s decision does not render a 50% share-
holder powerless to stop the company’s remaining 50% shareholder from 
breaching his fiduciary responsibilities.”); Ono v. Itoyama, 884 F. Supp. 892, 
895–900 (D.N.J. 1995); Anmaco, Inc. v. Bohlken, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 679 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (“[Defendant] Bohlken is not only an equal director and shareholder, 
but is also Chief Executive Officer of the company. The proper vehicle for such a 
suit, when the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, is a share-
holders’ derivative action.”); Sterling Indus. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 84 N.E.2d 
790, 794 (N.Y. 1949) (“Plaintiff has an appropriate remedy by action in which it 
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Innovative Therapy Products v. Roe, courts prefer derivative suits 
in these circumstances because they do not permit plaintiff pres-
idents to recover fees from the corporation unless they win on 
the merits against their co-equal shareholders.163 One major prem-
ise of this reasoning is that plaintiff corporate presidents can 
still, with some added risk, recover for wrongs of defendant co-
equal shareholder directors.164 Using the initiation-defense-removal 
analogy to determine that presidents generally lack authority to 
remove to federal court because they have no authority to bring 
suit would appear to undermine this principle.165 As the analogy 
was framed by the parties in Swart, a defendant who has no 
authority to initiate or remove also has no authority to defend 
suit on behalf of the corporation, let alone win on the merits.166 
C. Rethinking the Initiation-Defense-Removal Analogy’s Role in 
Presidential Authority 
A court could, however, combine portions of the reasoning 
outlined in Sections III.A–B to craft a novel way to deal with the 
challenges of removal authority.167 This approach would temper 
the similarities between suit initiation, defense, and removal with a 
recognition that removal is, in many regards, unlike defending a 
case.168 A court could accordingly determine that a corporate 
president possesses emergency authority to defend suit against 
a 50% co-equal shareholder co-director without concluding that 
                                                                                                                        
may obtain any necessary provisional remedy as well as prompt trial. That is 
by a stockholder’s derivative action.”); Stone v. Frederick, 666 N.Y.S.2d 294, 
295 (App. Div. 1997) (“[W]here there are only two stockholders each with a 50% 
share, an action cannot be maintained in the name of the corporation by one 
stockholder against another with an equal interest and degree of control over 
corporate affairs; the proper remedy is a stockholder’s derivative action.”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
163 See Innovative Therapy Prods., 1998 WL 405049, at *6 (“A 50% shareholder 
should not be permitted to use the corporation’s assets to attack his corporate 
partner. In a shareholder derivative suit, the claimant is only entitled to have 
the corporation pay his attorney fees if his action proves successful.”). 
164 See id. 
165 See generally 2A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 79, § 618.10. 
166 See Opening Response Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 9–10; see 
also Innovative Therapy Prods., 1998 WL 405049, at *6. 
167 See supra Sections III.A–B; infra notes 168–73 and accompanying text. 
168 See Section II.A. Contra Opening Response Brief of Appellees, supra 
note 69, at 9–10. 
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removal is an exigency of such an emergency or a derivative of 
“general and active management” authority.169 Such reasoning 
would allow a corporation’s president to defend the case on the 
merits in state court, just as an individual could recover on the 
merits in a derivative suit.170 Scrapping the initiation-defense-
removal analogy would gut the arguments of Swart,171 but it would 
also provide a method of reasoning that avoids the complications 
arising from their arguments.172 
The diversity context presents a possible challenge for this 
melded approach.173 When removal power does diverge from the 
ability to defend and initiate suit, it usually does not betray the 
rationale of removal jurisdiction: the idea that defendants should 
be able to avoid potentially prejudicial state court fora.174 For exam-
ple, the bar to removal where a defendant is a resident of the 
state where a case is filed is consistent with this justification.175 
However, this solution does not betray the rationale of 
removal ex ante.176 Boards of directors hold the power to author-
ize litigation, and they must act as one entity to do so.177 Where, 
as in Swart, a board or a bylaw has not granted the president 
the power to unilaterally engage in litigation, the corporation 
generally maintains the sole power to authorize litigation in all 
matters except those within the ordinary business of the corpo-
ration.178 Therefore, the board is the entity which acts on behalf 
of the corporation to decide whether or not a specific forum could 
prejudice the business.179 There is no way to know whether a 
                                                                                                                        
169 See supra Sections III.A–B. 
170 Id. 
171 See Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 14–19; Opening Re-
sponse Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 7–10. 
172 See supra Sections III.A–B. 
173 See, e.g., supra Section II.A. 
174 See 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 90, § 107.3; see also supra notes 96–99 
and accompanying text. 
175 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012); 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 90, § 107.3. 
176 See infra notes 178–82 and accompanying text. 
177 See 2A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 79, § 535. 
178 See, e.g., Swart v. Pawar, No. 17-167, 2015 WL 7430795, at *12–15 
(N.D.W.V. Nov. 19, 2015); Covington Housing Dev. v. City of Covington, 381 
F. Supp. 427, 429–30 (E.D. Ky. 1974). But see Lydia E. Pinkham Med. Co. v. 
Gove, 9 N.E.2d 573, 579–80 (Mass. 1937). 
179 See, e.g., 2A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 79, § 535; supra note 175 and 
accompanying text. 
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forum could actually prejudice the corporation without such a board 
determination, as it, rather than the president, is the only body 
which can answer this question.180 Ex ante; a solution which denies 
a president unilateral removal authority does not violate the ra-
tionale that removal rights are necessary to avoid state court preju-
dices.181 A rule that acknowledges the authority of corporate 
presidents to defend suit against co-equal co-director sharehold-
ers in emergency circumstances, but stops short of granting the 
authority to unilaterally consent to removal, would protect a cor-
poration’s financial interests without allowing presidents to benefit 
as individuals from assuming any more powers from boards of 
directors than necessary.182 
CONCLUSION 
Swart v. Pawar presented a novel question of law: does the 
president of a corporation with “general and active management” 
powers have the authority to unilaterally consent to removal on 
behalf of the corporation in a suit against a 50% co-equal share-
holder and co-director?183 The District Court for the Northern 
District of West Virginia and the Fourth Circuit did not directly 
address this question,184 but the parties raised interesting ar-
guments analogizing the authority to consent to removal to the 
presidential authority to initiate and defend.185 Although the 
analogy of removal to suit initiation and defense is imperfect, it 
is a somewhat useful tool for evaluating case law on litigative 
authority in corporate litigation similar to that of Swart.186 An 
                                                                                                                        
180 See, e.g., 2A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 79, § 535; supra notes 175–77 
and accompanying text. 
181 See 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 90, § 107.3 (outlining the rationale); 
supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
182 See 2A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 79, § 535 (discussing the authority 
of boards of directors over litigative decisions); supra notes 167–82 and ac-
companying text. Presidents would stand to personally benefit from an assump-
tion of board removal authority under circumstances similar to those of the 
Swart case: where they, as individual defendants, want to remove to federal court 
and need codefendant corporations’ assent to do so. See generally Swart v. 
Pawar, 684 F. App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2017). 
183 See supra Introduction. 
184 See supra Sections I.A–B. 
185 See supra Parts I–II. 
186 See supra Parts II–III. 
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evaluation of presidential litigative authority in co-equal share-
holder co-director suits further shows that the analogy of initiation 
and defense to removal has pitfalls and strengths within the corpo-
rate context.187 The Supreme Court may have declined to hear 
the case and issue a precise rule on removal in Swart,188 but future 
courts could reasonably resolve the matter by recognizing the flaws 
of the initiation-defense-removal analogy and holding that a 
defendant president can defend a case in emergency circum-
stances without assuming the authority to unilaterally consent 
to removal.189 
 
                                                                                                                        
187 See supra Sections III.A–B. 
188 Swart v. Pawar, No. 1:14-CV-10, 2015 WL 8056115, at *1 (N.D.W.V. 
Dec. 4, 2015), aff’d per curiam, 684 F. App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
No. 17-167, 2017 WL 3324960 (2017). 
189 See Section III.C. 
